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Assessing the Effects of Mergers and Acquisitions on  
Firm Performance, Plant Productivity, and Workers: 
New Evidence from Matched Employer-Employee Data  
 
Abstract 
  Studies of the effects of mergers and acquisitions focus on a single unit of analysis: firms, 
plants, or workers.  In contrast, we model these events as transactions that simultaneously have 
cross-levels effects.  Based on the theory of human capital, we generate a set of predictions 
regarding the antecedents and consequences of firm, plant, and worker turnover.  Our empirical 
analysis  is  based  on  longitudinal,  linked  employer-employee  data  for  virtually  the  entire 
population of Swedish manufacturing firms and employees for the period 1985-1998.  These data 
allow  us  to  assess  the  effects  of  mergers  and  acquisitions  on  firm  performance,  plant 
productivity, levels of employment, and compensation.  Consistent with human capital theory, 
we  find  that  mergers  and  acquisitions  lead  to  improvements  in  firm  performance  and  plant 
productivity, although they also result in the downsizing of establishments and firms.  These 
transactions also appear to enhance the careers of workers because they provide a mechanism for 
improving the sorting and matching or workers and managers to firms and industries that best 
suit their skills.  
 
 
Keywords:  Mergers and Acquisitions, Total Factor Productivity, Compensation, Matched 
                   Employer-Employee Data  
JEL Codes: G34, D24, C81 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The resurgence in mergers, acquisitions, and divestitures has focused greater attention on 
assessing the impact of these transactions on organizations and workers.  Empirical studies of the 
effects of these transactions typically examine a single unit of analysis: firms, plants, or workers. 
Firm-level analyses evaluate the impact of changes in corporate control on short-run stock prices 
(“event studies”), long-run stock prices, or accounting profits of companies whose shares are 
publicly-traded  (e.g.,  Harrison,  Hitt,  Hoskisson,  and  Ireland,  1991;  Hoskisson,  Johnson,  and 
Moesel,  1994;  Jensen,  1988,  1993;  Ravenscraft  and  Scherer,  1987;  McWilliams  and  Siegel, 
1997).   
A recent meta analysis by King, Dalton, Daily, and Covin (2004) reviewed 93 empirical 
studies of the antecedents and consequences of mergers and acquisitions.  This paper concluded 
that acquiring firms do not experience an increase in post-acquisition accounting profitability, 
even though share prices rise (for both acquired and acquiring firms) soon after such events are 
announced.  That is, even though the stock market anticipates that synergies will arise from 
acquisitions, these gains do not appear to be realized.   
Although share prices and accounting profits are useful performance indicators, they may 
be imperfect measures of organizational efficiency or productivity.  Inferences regarding the 
ability of the stock market to accurately reflect changes in firm efficiency are problematic when 
the assumptions of efficient markets are violated (Shleifer, 2001).  Accounting measures of profit 
have also been criticized by researchers in economics and finance because they are also not 
necessarily perfectly correlated with real performance and can be subject to manipulation by 
managers (Benston, 1982).      4 
It is also important to note that many mergers and acquisitions involve privately-held 
companies or occur below the firm level (e.g., divisions of large, publicly-traded firms), which 
makes it virtually impossible to assess stock price or accounting profitability effects, except for 
transactions involving large, publicly-traded firms. Of course, these deals constitute only a small 
percentage of overall merger and acquisition activity.   Most transactions involve the sale of 
small, single-plant firms or the sale of a single plant or division by a larger firm (Siegel, Simons, 
and Lindstrom, 2005).    
The end result is that analyses of mergers and acquisitions based solely on information 
from public companies could yield misleading estimates of the impact of such transactions on 
performance.  As a result, several authors (e.g., Lichtenberg and Siegel 1987, 1990a, 1990b; 
McGuckin and Nguyen, 2001; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001; Harris, Siegel, and Wright, 2005) 
have asserted that a more desirable methodology is to eschew share price and profit measures 
and instead, assess the productivity of plants before and after ownership changes.
1   
Similar measurement concerns plague empirical research on the effects of mergers and 
acquisitions on workers.  In the management literature, there have been numerous studies of 
turnover involving top-level managers (“top management teams”) in the aftermath of mergers 
and acquisitions (Walsh, 1988, 1989; Hambrick and Canella, 1993; Krug and Hegarty, 1997, 
2001).   However, these transactions could affect employment, compensation, and career paths, 
not just for top managers, but for all workers.   
There  have  been  several  empirical  studies  of  the  employment  and  wage  effects  of 
mergers and acquisitions at the plant and firm-levels (Brown and Medoff, 1988; Lichtenberg and 
                                                 
1 Empirical evidence from the U.S. has been derived from the Census Bureau's Longitudinal Research Database 
(LRD).  Excellent reviews of LRD-based studies are presented in Caves (1998) and Bartelsman and Doms (2000). 
Empirical  evidence from the U.K. has been derived from the Annual  Respondents Database (ARD). The ARD 
consists of plant-level records from the U.K. Annual Census of Production   5 
Siegel, 1987, 1990a, 1990b; McGuckin et al., 1998; McGuckin and Nguyen, 2001; Conyon et al.,  
2002a,  2002b,  2004;  Gugler  and  Yurtoglu,  2004).    While  these  studies  enable  us  to  make 
inferences about what happens to the average worker at an establishment or company in the 
aftermath  of  these  transactions,  they  do  not  allow  assessment  of  the  effects  on  individual 
employees, nor on long-run careers.  That is because detailed data on employees involved in 
these transactions are unavailable to most researchers in publicly-available file (e.g., Compustat) 
or  even  proprietary,  confidential  datasets  (e.g.,  the  U.S.  Census  Bureau’s  Annual  Survey  of 
Manufacturing).  Thus, there is no direct, systematic, large-scale empirical evidence regarding 
the effects of a merger or acquisition on individual workers.  
Some scholars have asserted that corporate takeovers have deleterious effects on workers.  
For example, Shleifer and Summers (1987) conjecture that the new owners of a firm in the 
aftermath of a hostile takeover are more likely to abrogate implicit contracts with employees, 
with respect to wages, benefits, and pension contributions.  More specifically, they assert that 
shareholder wealth creation arising from corporate takeovers need not reflect improvements in 
economic welfare or efficiency.  Instead, the increase in economic performance may reflect a 
transfer of wealth from employees and other non-financial stakeholders to shareholders.  Others 
have alleged that mergers and acquisitions lead to substantial downsizing or even mass layoffs, 
usually basing their conclusions on small samples of “event studies” of large corporations.  Such 
layoffs have been alleged to have a traumatic, lasting negative impact on workers who are fired 
and  also  on  “survivors,”  or  those  who  remain  with  the  firm  in  the  aftermath  of  the  layoff 
(Brockner et al. (1987), Brockner (1988)).  
 In  contrast,  we  assert  that  takeovers  constitute  a  mechanism  for  enhancing  careers, 
particularly  when  the  transactions  result  in  the  implementation  of  new  technologies,  by   6 
stimulating  additional  investment  in  human  capital  and  promoting  “skill  upgrading”  of  the 
workforce.  We model corporate control changes as events that simultaneously have cross-levels 
effects on firms, plants and employees.  Based on the theory of human capital, we develop a set 
of predictions regarding firm, plant, and worker turnover.   
Our  empirical  analysis  is  based  on  longitudinal,  linked  employer-employee  data  for 
virtually the entire population of Swedish manufacturing firms and employees for the period 
1985-1998.  These data allow us to simultaneously assess the effects of mergers and acquisitions 
on firm performance, plant productivity, levels of employment, and compensation.   
 
II. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES  
 
 We draw on human capital theory to generate a set of hypotheses regarding cross-level 
effects of mergers and acquisitions on firms, plants, and workers, as well as career development.  
The first relevant concept is the notion of a “fit” or “match” between plants and firms and their 
owners.  This idea was first applied in the theory of labor turnover or job separation proposed by 
Jovanovic (1979), who asserted that some workers are particularly well-suited to a given job or 
establishment.    According  to  Jovanovic  (1979), if  a  worker  is  employed  in  the  right  job  or 
organization, a good match will result and he or she will experience higher wage growth than a 
similar worker.  On the other hand, a worker may instead be a bad match for a given task or a 
particular organization, with negative consequences for both the organization and the employee’s 
career.   
Building on this idea, Lichtenberg and Siegel (1987) outlined a “matching” theory of 
ownership change, in which the quality of the “fit” between heterogeneous plants and owners is 
reflected in the productivity of the organization.  Sub-par plant productivity constitutes a signal 
of a bad match involving an owner and a plant, which will be the major determinant of the firm-  7 
level decision to maintain or relinquish ownership of a given plant.  Holmes and Schmitz (1990) 
modified  this  framework  to  include  an  additional  human  capital  dimension  that  they  call 
“business quality,” which is directly related to the quality of the manager.  In their model, high 
quality managers buy companies that implement high quality projects based on new ideas.  
Jovanovic  and  Rousseau  (2002)  also  conjectured  that  there  is  a  positive  association 
between  high  quality  projects  and  high  quality  employees.    In  their  theoretical  framework, 
mergers and takeovers allow for the diffusion of new technologies and the reallocation of capital 
to more efficient uses and to better managers.   Thus, according to the authors, these transactions 
play a role similar to the efficiency-enhancing, dynamic adjustment associated with entry and 
exit.  
 
Hypotheses Relating to Workers and the Plant’s Use of Labor 
 
We  now  synthesize  and  extend  these  ideas  to  generate  a  set  of  testable  empirical 
propositions regarding cross-level effects of mergers and acquisitions.  Let us begin at the lowest 
level of aggregation, the micro or employee-level.  Mergers and acquisitions can be expected to 
have  differential  effects  on  employees.    First,  we  consider  employees  at  a  given  plant  or 
establishment that is sold to another firm.   The new owners of these facilities recognize that the 
merger or acquisition creates a window of opportunity for improving the sorting and matching of 
workers.   They use the transaction as a mechanism to discard unproductive workers, upgrade the 
skills  of  existing  workers,  and  hire  new  employees  whose  skills  better  suit  the  “new” 
organization.  
On the managerial side, another signal of a bad match occurs when workers are “over-
compensated,”  relative  to  employees  with  similar  characteristics  in  the  same  industry.    If 
matching is working well and workers are well-sorted, they should be paid on the basis of their   8 
productivity.   When there is a bad match, a worker may be paid the prevailing wage, even when 
he or she is not productive enough to warrant this level of compensation.   Thus, we have our 
first hypothesis pertaining to workers:   
Hypothesis 1: Workers Employed at Plants That Are Destined to Be Sold Earn 
Higher Levels of Compensation Than Comparable Employees   
 
An  implication  of  this  view  is  that  these  transactions  should  result  in  a  decline  in 
employment at facilities that are sold, since a change in corporate ownership can be used as a 
mechanism for shedding unproductive workers (“bad matches”) and reducing costs.   Thus, for 
representative  plants  that  are  involved  in  a  merger  or  acquisition,  we  should  observe  a 
downsizing of the workforce:  
Hypothesis 2: Plants that are sold experience a decline in employment, relative to 
comparable plants that are not sold.  
 
It  is  also  likely  that  mergers  and  acquisitions  stimulate  organizational  change,  which 
suggests that “skill upgrading” of the workforce will result.   A merger or acquisition can be 
thought of as a type of technological change, which often involves the transfer of new knowledge 
and the implementation of new production processes. Under this scenario, the firm’s demand for 
educated workers should increase.  That is because highly-educated workers are likely to have a 
comparative advantage in helping the firm implement technological and organizational change, 
which arises from their ability to solve problems and adapt to change in the work environment.
2    
It also follows from human capital theory that the average “quality” of the workforce, as 
proxied by levels of education, increases after an establishment is sold to a new owner.  This 
occurs for two reasons.  First, new owners tend to dismiss lower-quality workers.  Another cause 
                                                 
2 There is considerable evidence in the literature on “skill-biased technological change” (see Siegel (1999), Siegel, 
Waldman,  and  Youngdahl  (1997))  for  comprehensive  reviews  of  this  literature)  that  technological  change  is 
associated with downsizing and skill-upgrading of the workforce.   9 
of the increase in average labor quality is that the new owners of the plant will tend to hire 
workers with higher levels of education and skill.  Thus, we have our third hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 3: Plants that are sold experience an increase in average worker quality, 
relative to comparable plants that are not sold.  
 
 
Hypotheses Relating to Plant and Firm Performance  
 
  Matching of plants and owners has two implications for plant and firm performance.   
The first is that the lower the productivity of a plant, relative to average productivity in its 
industry, the higher is the probability that the plant will be sold.  That is because the quality of 
the match is the primary determinant of the corporate-level decision to relinquish or maintain 
ownership of the facility.  Lower relative productivity is a signal of a bad match.  A second 
implication of the model is that when a merger or acquisition occurs, even an average match can 
be expected to lead to above average productivity growth because a better match will result.  
Thus, we have the following hypotheses relating to the performance of plants before and after a 
sale:  




Hypothesis 5: Plants experience an increase in performance after a sale.  
 
  It is also likely that matching works more effectively for partial acquisitions than for full 
acquisitions.  That is, when a firm purchases one or several plants from another company, it can 
better assess the quality of the match than when it purchases a firm consisting of multiple 
divisions and numerous establishments.  Matching works more effectively with fewer facilities, 
which allow the new owners to “cherry pick.”   Thus, we expect improvements in performance to 
be more pronounced for partial acquisitions, as opposed to full acquisitions.  This leads to our 
last hypothesis:   10 
Hypothesis 6: The partial acquisition of a multi-plant firm leads to more substantial 
improvement in performance than a full acquisition of an entire multi-plant 
company.  
 
In the following section, we outline our methods and discuss other empirical issues.   
 
III. METHODS  
 
  To  test  these  hypotheses,  we  estimate  several  productivity,  output,  employment,  and 
earnings equations at the firm, plant, and individual levels.  Productivity analysis begins with the 
notion  of  a  production  function,  which  is  a  graphical  or  algebraic  representation  of  the 
relationship between the inputs or resources an organization uses and the output it produces.  A 
common approach to productivity measurement is to specify a functional form for the production 
function and then regression analysis to estimate the parameters of this function.
3  In a seminal 
article, Cobb and Douglas (1928) proposed a functional form for estimating the relationship 
between the inputs of labor (L) and capital (K) and output (Q) in U.S. manufacturing industries.  
Assuming constant returns to scale, their production function (in log-log form) was represented 
as:   (1)     ln Q  = ln A + α ln K + β ln L 
where  Q  represents  the  quantity  of  output,  A  represents  a  constant  term,  K  represents  the 
quantity of capital input, and L represents the quantity (hours) of labor input.   
  Another input should be included in this equation: intermediate goods and materials (M), 
in order to estimate total factor productivity, which is considered to be the best indicator of plant 
performance.  Total factor productivity is preferred to a partial productivity measure, such as 
labor productivity, because it takes account of all resources, such as capital (physical capital, 
plant, and equipment) and materials (intermediate goods), as well as labor.  We also need to 
                                                 
3 See  Majumdar and  Marcus (2001) and McWilliams, Siegel, and Van Fleet (2005) for a more comprehensive 
discussion of non-parametric methods of productivity measurement.     11 
control for a variety of factors which might explain why some plants generate more output than 
others (e.g., the age of the plant).  Most importantly, we wish to assess how relative (i.e., relative 
to  other  plants  in  the  same  industry)  output,  productivity,  employment  and  human  capital 
variables behave before and after a merger or acquisition.      
  The productivity equations we estimate is:  
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where  ijt L ,  ijt K , and  ijt M  are labor, capital and materials for plant or firm i in industry j at year t, 
ijt MA !l are the year-specific merger or acquisition dummy variables, and  ijt ND !l are “no-data” 
dummy variables that allow us to control for measure error and sample selection biases (see 
Siegel, Simons, and Lindstrom (2005) for further clarification), and   is output, employment, 
average worker experience, and average worker education for plant or firm i in industry j at year 
t.
4  Each regression is estimated with detailed industry level (4-digit SIC) fixed effects.  Thus, the 
coefficients on the non-merger or acquisition variables (labor, capital and materials) are 
                                                 
4 The equations do not include plant fixed effects, only industry fixed effects, because including plant fixed effects 
would make it impossible to observe whether plants that experience a merger or acquisition tend to have persistently 
low or high productivity or indeed to know how these plants compare to their industry (and age and time) averages 
at all – all patterns crucial to the hypotheses posed herein.    12 
weighted means of industry-specific coefficients. 
Earnings Equation  
At the individual level, we estimate the following earnings equation:  
(4) 
12
ieft it it et ft t it
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where EARNieft denotes the natural logarithm of annual earnings of individual i working in 
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relationship to a merger or acquisition using coefficients  !l as discussed below.  INDIVit refers 
to  a  set  of  individual-specific  factors:  gender,  national  origin,  age,  categories  of  educational 
attainment,  field  of  education,  and  location,  along  with  a  continuous  measure  of  employee 
experience.
6  ESTABLISHMENTet is a set of establishment-specific characteristics: plant age, 
size (as measured by the logarithm of employment), average wage, relative productivity (i.e., 
relative to other plants in the same industry), and five-digit SIC industry dummies.  FIRMft refers 
to firm-specific characteristics: total employment, R&D intensity (commonly thought to reflect 
technological change), average wage, number of plants, and a dummy variable denoting whether 
the firm operates in diverse industries.  t !  is a year-specific fixed effect, and  it !  is the remaining 
classical disturbance term (random noise).   We also include dummies for self-employment (and 
self-employment simultaneously with organizational employment), in order to assess the extent 
to which changes in compensation can be attributed to shifts between organizational and self 
employment.   
                                                 
5 In the current version of the paper, the intercept term is constrained to be the same for all employees.  In a revised 
version, we will present fixed effects estimates for employees. 
6 Effects of age are represented using a series of dummy variables because very young and very old workers in 
Sweden are often subject to mandatory restrictions on compensation.     13 
  The treatment of a merger or acquisition in the econometric analysis requires careful 
consideration.  In equations (2)-(4),  l denotes the year relative to the year of the merger or 
acquisition,  so  that  negative  values  of  l  signify  years  preceding  ownership  change,  0 = l  
denotes the year during which an employee’s plant changed owners, and positive values of  l 
pertain to years following the ownership change.  The matching from employee to plant is done 
in the year preceding the merger or acquisition.  That is, the analyses carried out here address the 
performance of workers who were in establishment e in November of the year preceding the year 
during which the establishment changed owners.   it MA !l is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
individual  i  was  in  a  plant,  in  November  of  the  preceding  year,  that  changed  owner  (with 
certainty) l years preceding the current year t for  0 ! l , or  l  years following the current year 
for  0 < l , or 0 otherwise.  Note that our sample allows us to identify each manufacturing plant’s 
owner for the years 1985 through 1998, so a new owner can be identified in each year for 1986 
through 1998.  For an individual observed in 1985, we wish to know up to 13 years in the future 
whether they will have just been (in the preceding November) in a plant that is experiencing a 
merger or acquisition, while for an individual observed in 1998, we wish to know whether they 
experienced  such  a  plant  merger  or  acquisition  event  up  to  12  years  in  the  past.    This 
consideration of past and future changes in corporate ownership yields a possible range of leads 
and lags from –13 to +12. 
  The relation of earnings and employment status to past and future merger or acquisition 
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, where  !l parameterizes the relation to merger or acquisition at lead/lag  l.  To 
avoid model specification bias, each  !l is unconstrained, and parameters are estimated over the   14 
full range of l from –13 to +12.  The fitted terms of !l provide estimates of the relationship of 
merger or acquisition to earnings and employment status. 
   
IV. DATA  
  Our  empirical  analysis  is  based  on  linked,  longitudinal  employer-employee  data  on 
Swedish workers and plants that employ them.  The file covers every employee in Sweden in 
every year from 1985 to 1998.  The full database contains 36,398,617 records across the 14 years 
of data, for an average of 2.6 million workers per year, consistent with the Swedish population of 
close to 9 million.  Establishment level data are available for the majority of employees if and 
when they were employed in the manufacturing sector, so that 9,251,962 records have matching 
information available about the employee’s plant (and usually firm) workplace. 
 The  database  facilitates  our  investigation  of  employment  status  and  earnings.  
Employment  is  recorded  each  year  in  November,  and  given  that  the  database  covers  all 
employees, we infer that a worker whose record is missing in a given year was not employed in 
Sweden during that year.  Annual earnings are recorded from employees’ official tax filings, and 
are divided into earnings paid by an organization versus self-employment and other earnings.
7  
Self-employment income serves as a proxy for whether the employee was self-employed, and we 
use the two sources of income to divide each working employee into one of three categories in 
each year: organizationally employed, self-employed, or both.   
For  individual  employees,  the  data  include  the  person’s  gender,  national  origin,  age, 
geographic  location,  year  of  last  educational  exam,  categorical  variables  for  educational 
attainment and field of education, and 5-digit SIC industry classification of employment.  In a 
                                                 
7 The data do not include hours worked or hourly wages, only annual total income, for specific employees.   15 
previous paper (Siegel, Simons, and Lindstrom, 2005), we used some of this information to 
construct plant-level measures of workforce characteristics, such as the percentage of workers 
who are female, the percentage who were born in Sweden versus immigrated, the mean age of 
employees, mean experience as proxied by years elapsed since last year of education, and the 
percentage of employees with at least some college-level education.   
Each record contains data on gender and national origin.  The national origin information 
is  based  on  an  employee’s  birthplace,  divided  between  Sweden,  other  Nordic  countries,  the 
remainder of Europe, and five other world regions (Asia, Africa, North America, South America, 
and other nations).  Employees’ geographic locations, available for 99.6% of records, correspond 
to 338 local governments.  Educational attainment and broad field of education are likewise 
recorded categorically, and are available for 97% of records.  Attainment is categorized as 0-8 
years, 9-10 years (obligatory in Sweden), 11-12 years, 13-14 years (equivalent to a normal high 
school education similar to U.S. grade twelve), college or university education for one to two 
years (including extended high school engineering programs), college or university education for 
three or more years but not PhD education, or PhD education.  Field of education is categorized 
as basic (general) education; esthetics, language, and religion; pedagogy; trade, office, economic, 
social, and behavioral degrees; industry-relevant education including handcrafts, engineering, 
mathematics,  physics,  chemistry,  and  biology;  transportation  and  communication;  caring 
including  nursing,  child  care,  and  geriatric  care;  farming,  gardening,  forestry,  and  fishing; 
general service skills including private guards and military service; or other areas of education.  
The  data  record  the  year  of  an  employee’s  last  educational  examination  in  45%  of 
records, and a proxy for employee work experience is constructed in these cases as the logarithm 
of the number of years (including the last educational year) since finishing education.  This   16 
proxy for experience is likely to be an adequate control despite the paucity of information on 
educational examination year, because examination year information is mainly lacking among 
older employees, for whom age dummies (also included as control variables) provide a good 
proxy for experience.  The employee’s current industry classification of activity, available in 
97.6% of records, divides employees into one of 1,092 categories based on either 1969 Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, used where available, or 1992 SIC codes, used in later 
years.  Given that 1969 and 1992 industrial classifications cannot be matched precisely, separate 
categories are used for 1969 versus 1992 industry codes.
8  Categorical variables for gender, 
national origin, geographic locations, educational attainment, field of education, and industry are 
represented in our analyses using 0-1 dummy variables. 
Although employee, plant, or firm data are missing for some observations, we do not 
exclude records from the sample on the basis of missing data, to avoid potential sample selection 
bias.  Instead, we set the values of missing variables equal to the population mean or zero, and 
add  dummy  variables  that  equal  one  when  the  relevant  type  of  data  is  unavailable  or  zero 
otherwise.  Hence all these variables are used as controls to the full extent possible, while records 
with  missing  observations  are  allowed  to  differ  on  average  from  records  with  available 
information. 
  The data on individual manufacturing employees were linked to data at the plant level.  
Although plant-level data are available only for manufacturing plants, they provide a means to 
control for potentially important effects of plant-related characteristics on earnings.  Moreover, 
the measures of merger or acquisition used here depend upon the plant-level data.  We also 
                                                 
8 This makes the industry categories perfectly multi-collinear with the year-specific dummy variables, requiring that 
an  appropriately  chosen  dummy  variable  be  dropped  from  the  model,  with  the  ramification  that  the  estimated 
coefficients of year and industry dummy variables cannot be fully disentangled.  Hence these variables are simply 
used as controls and their estimated values are not reported.   17 
require plant-level data to test our theoretical proposition regarding the effects of mergers and 
acquisitions on productivity, output, employment, and human capital.   
  Following conventional international standards, the plant or establishment is defined as a 
physically  independent  unit  within  a  firm.    Each  plant  is  assumed  to  produce  for  a  single 
industry.    Firms  that  are  involved  in  multiple  activities  at  the  same  physical  address  report 
separate figures for each activity, which are then recorded as a separate facility.  In most cases, 
however, firms focus on a single activity, implying that the local units are seldom split into 
several plants.  Plants that were considered to be “non-active” and “help plants,” such as sales 
offices, were excluded from the data. 
Next, we address whether our sample of manufacturing plants is representative of the 
population of establishments.  According to Swedish law, each business is required to report 
information to Statistics Sweden on an annual basis.  In 1946, the certainty criterion for inclusion 
in the annual survey of manufacturing plants was established at a minimum of 5 employees and 
10,000 Swedish kroner (about 1,300 US dollars) in production value.  In 1990, this certainty 
threshold was raised to a minimum of 10 employees, while a stratified sampling procedure is 
applied to smaller plants.
9 
To assess the quality of our sample coverage, we compared the size distribution of our 
sample of plants to corresponding values for the population of Swedish manufacturing plants at 
two  points  in  time:  1986  and  1995.    We  found  that  our  sample  contains  an  overwhelming 
majority of plants with more than 20 employees.  Sample coverage of plants with more than 20 
employees increased from 86% in 1986 to 95% in 1995.  
                                                 
9 In 1997, the certainty threshold officially was raised to a minimum of 20 employees, but given evolving sampling 
procedures for smaller plants this change appears to have had little effect.  The plant-level dataset actually includes 
mining as well as manufacturing plants; mining plants make up about 3% of the total.  The certainty threshold 
increases in 1990 and 1997 affected only manufacturing plants.    18 
We also analyzed the incidence of mergers and acquisitions involving the plants in our 
sample.  Over the entire sample period (1985-1998), 5.1% of our establishments experienced at 
least one merger or acquisition.  These rates of ownership turnover are slightly higher when they 
are weighted by value-added and employment.   
 
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
Table 1 contains correlations, means and standard deviations for key variables used in the 
regression  analysis.  Note  that  these  variables  are  measured  at  three  levels  of  aggregation: 
individual, plant, and firm.  Not surprisingly, we observe strong positive correlations between 
experience and earnings (.41), age and experience (.67), the various inputs or resources used to 
produce output (capital, labor, and materials), and R&D intensity  and the percentage of workers 
with at least some college education (.32). 
We  begin  our  regression  analysis  of  the  effects  of  mergers  and  acquisitions  at  the 
employee level.  As a first cut, in Table 2, we report OLS estimates of earning equations, based 
on the specification outlined in equation (4).  To save space, we only report coefficients on the 
mergers and acquisitions dummy variables in the seven years preceding and following a merger 
or acquisition.   
We focus our attention on the coefficients on the merger or acquisition dummy variables.  
These  estimates  indicate  that  workers  whose  plants  are  destined  to  experience  a  merger  or 
acquisition earned 1-2% more than observationally equivalent employees in years shortly before 
a merger or acquisition, with wages falling back to comparable amounts over the next few years.   
Figure  1  plots  this  relationship  in  the  estimates,  showing  the  estimated  coefficients 
(multiplied  by  100  to  convert  to  percentages)  in  the  seven  years  preceding  and  following  a   19 
merger or acquisition.  These graphs make it easy to visualize the relation of compensation to 
ownership change.  The horizontal axis in each graph spans a 15-year period, from 7 years before 
ownership change to 7 years after ownership change.  The vertical axis corresponds to the values 
of the estimated coefficients, and hence to the relation of ownership change to compensation at a 
given time relative to the year of a merger or acquisition.  The curve drawn across the diagram 
shows the annually changing values of compensation relative to the industry (and age and year) 
norm.  For each coefficient estimate, its 95% confidence band clarifies the range of error in the 
estimates.  Lighter lines in the 5 years pre- and post-ownership change indicate 95% confidence 
bands for means before and after a merger or acquisition, and a 95% band drawn at year 0 
pertains to the change between the 5-year periods pre- to post-ownership change.  Our findings 
strongly support Hypothesis 1, in which we conjectured that workers employed at plants that 
experience  a  merger  or  acquisition  earn  higher  levels  of  compensation  than  observationally 
equivalent workers.   
In Table 3, we present averages of the coefficients on the merger or acquisition dummies 
in the earnings equations for 5 years before and 5 years after the transaction (we exclude year 0, 
which is the year of the acquisition). We also formally test whether the post vs. pre merger or 
acquisition effects are statistically significant.  The findings also clearly indicate that ownership 
change reduces the extent of “overcompensation.”  This can be viewed as an indicator of an 
improvement in management quality resulting for a new match.    
We now shift our focus to empirical tests of the establishment and firm-level hypotheses.  
The first set of results is presented in Table 4.  The coefficients on labor, capital, and materials in 
the  output/productivity  equation  are  consistent  with  previous  plant-level  studies  (see  Siegel, 
Simons,  and  Lindstrom,  2005).    Note  that  the  number  of  observations  is  smaller  for  the   20 
productivity equation because capital measures are available only from 1989 onward.  
As before, when we considered earnings, the key coefficients on Table 4 are those on the 
merger and acquisitions dummies.  For example, the value -.056 for the estimated coefficient of 
1 MA!  in the productivity equation signifies that plants experiencing a merger or acquisition one 
year hence were 5.6 percent less productive, on average, than comparable establishments that did 
not change owners.  Note that while the relative performance of plants involved in a merger or 
acquisition was significantly worse before the transaction, relative efficiency appears to have 
improved after the ownership change, as these establishments converged to the average level of 
industry performance.  The results indicate that productivity steadily deteriorating to a low of 
nearly 6 percent below average followed by a steady return to average and higher productivity 
after the ownership change.    
In Figure 2, we plot the estimated coefficients on the merger and acquisition dummies in 
the  productivity  equations  (multiplied  by  100  to  convert  to  percentages)  in  the  seven  years 
preceding and following a merger or acquisition.  These values can be interpreted as measures of 
the difference in productivity between plants that are involved in a merger or acquisition and 
those establishments within the same industry that do not experience such an event.  The graph 
suggests  a  “U-shaped”  productivity  effect,  which  is  consistent  with  our  proposed  matching 
theory in the sense that productivity is declining before a corporate control change and increasing 
in  the  aftermath  of  these  events.    The  end  result  is  that  our  findings  appear  to  confirm 
Hypotheses  5  and  6,  which  asserted  that  plants  that  are  sold  are  less  productive  before  the 
transaction and experience an improvement in relative performance after they are sold. 
The output and employment results, which are presented in the last two columns of Table 
4, help explain the productivity increase.  Plants that changed owners apparently had higher   21 
output and employment than comparable plants both before and after a merger or acquisition.  
They reduced both output and employment after an ownership change.
10  The latter result is 
consistent with Hypothesis 2, which states that mergers and acquisitions are associated with a 
downsizing of the workforce.  Note that employment declined at a faster rate than output, which 
resulted in a productivity increase.   
   In Table 5, we present averages of the coefficients on the ownership change dummies in 
the productivity, output, and employment equations for 5 years before and 5 years after the 
transaction (we exclude year 0, which is the year of the acquisition).  Our findings are also 
presented separately for full acquisitions and partial acquisitions.  The “post-pre” results in the 
first panel of Table 7 confirm our earlier finding that plants involved in a merger or an ownership 
change became more productive after the transaction.  From the 5 years before to the 5 years 
after a merger or acquisition, productivity is estimated to have increased by 1.7 (p<.01).  We also 
find  that  output  and  employment  were  reduced  after  ownership  change,  with  employment 
declining more than output.  Output is estimated to have declined by 8.6% (p<.001) from the pre- 
to post-ownership change 5-year periods, and employment is estimated to have decreased by 
12.0% (p<.001). 
Consistent  with  hypothesis  7,  we  find  that  plants  that  were  acquired  in  a  partial 
acquisition are estimated to have experienced slightly higher (2.6%) productivity growth than 
establishments that were purchased as part of a full acquisition (1.4%).   
                                                 
10 Although the change in output could result either from a decision on the part of the new owners or a firm-specific 
shock that triggers ownership change, there is some evidence that the output reductions may in fact result from the 
decisions of the new management.  First, similar declines in output do not coincide with the gradual reduction in 
productivity that precedes ownership change.  Second, the same decline in output and employment are apparent after 
adding industry-year interactions to the model using 4-digit SIC codes, thereby controlling for possible industry-
specific demand shocks.  This leaves open the possibility of other shocks that lead to ownership change and also to 
downsizing.   22 
In Table 8, we present similar aggregated (five years before and five years after a merger 
or  acquisition)  regression  results  for  the  additional  plant-level  variables  relating  to  human 
capital: average experience, percentage of college-educated workers, and earnings.  The findings 
in Table 8 imply that plants involved in ownership change experienced estimated increases in 
experience by 0.17 year (p<.01), and in the percentage of employees with a college education by 
(an absolute amount of) 0.18% (p<.05).  We also find that ownership change resulted in an 
increase in employees’ mean earnings (as always, relative to the industry and plant age and year 
norm)  by  1.3% (p<.001).   These  results  appear  to  confirm  our  hypothesis  that  mergers  and 
acquisitions result in an increase in average worker quality.   
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS  
Using  the  theory  of  human  capital,  we  generate  a  set  of  hypotheses  regarding  the 
antecedents and consequences of firm, plant, and worker turnover.  These predictions are based 
on  the  role  of  “matching”  in  the  labor  market  and  the  market  for  corporate  control.    Our 
empirical  analysis  is  based  on  longitudinal,  linked  employer-employee  data  for  virtually  the 
entire  population  of  Swedish  manufacturing firms  and  employees  for  the  period  1985-1998.  
These data allow us to assess the effects of mergers and acquisitions on firm performance, plant 
productivity,  employment,  compensation,  and  the  career  development  of  workers.  
  Consistent  with  human  capital  theory,  we  find  that  mergers  and  acquisitions  lead  to 
improvements  in  firm  performance  and  plant  productivity,  although  they  also  result  in  the 
downsizing of establishments and firms.  Specifically, we find that plants are less productive 
than comparable plants before a merger or acquisition.   Our results also indicate that plants 
involved  in  a  merger  or  acquisition  had  higher  output  and  employment  than  comparable 
establishments  before  the  transaction.    The  increase  in  productivity  after  the  transfer  of   23 
ownership appears to be the result of a decline in output, combined with an even larger reduction 
in employment.  Finally, our results indicate that the improvement in productivity is greater for 
partial acquisitions of firms than for acquisitions of an entire company.   
These transactions also appear to enhance the careers of workers because they provide a 
mechanism  for  improving  the  sorting  and  matching  or  workers  and  managers  to  firms  and 
industries  that  best  suit  their  skills.  Our  findings  are  consistent  with  recent  theoretical  and 
empirical evidence (see Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001, 2002) 
suggesting that takeovers and asset sales result in the reallocation of a firm’s resources to more 
efficient uses and to better managers.   
We also find that plants involved in a merger or acquisition experienced an upgrading in 
the “quality” of human capital.  That is, we observe increases in average employee experience 
and education.  Ownership change also led to an increase in earnings for those who remain 
employed at the establishment.  Finally, it appears as though workers in plants that experience a 
merger  or  acquisition  receive  higher  compensation  than  comparable  workers.    This  relative 
compensation gap is reduced to the norm in the aftermath of the transaction.     
In  future,  we  hope  to  provide  additional  evidence  on  the  impact  of  mergers  and 
acquisitions on careers, by making full use of each employee’s complete work history.   These 
data can be used to assess worker transitions across and within firms and industries.  It would 
also be interesting to determine whether workers are more likely to become self-employed in the 
aftermath of an ownership change, and how this affects their subsequent compensation.        24 
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 Table 1  
Correlations, Means, and Standard Deviations of Worker, Plant, and Firm Characteristics  
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   +p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01 
Figures shown are computed at the highest level of aggregation possible.  Employee figures are based on all individuals who ever worked in manufacturing during the 
sample period.  Sample sizes are reduced for selected variables   28 
Table 2 
Econometric Estimates of the Effects of Mergers and Acquisitions on Earnings  
      Dependent Variable: Log Earnings  Coefficient on:  
Experience                                 .095*** 
                             (.002) 
Female         -.377*** 
                             (.001) 
MAt-7  -.001 
(.001) 
MAt-6        .005*** 
(.001) 
MAt-5        .004*** 
(.001) 
MAt-4 
      .004*** 
(.001) 
MAt-3        .006*** 
(.001) 
MAt-2        .010*** 
(.001) 
MAt-1        .014*** 
(.001) 
MAt+0       .020*** 
(.001) 
MAt+1        .004*** 
(.001) 
MAt+2        .005*** 
(.001) 





MAt+5        .004*** 
(.001) 
MAt+6        .007*** 
(.001) 
MAt+7        .003*** 
(.001) 
R
2  0.477 
Number of Plants  15946 
Number of Workers  2096580 
Number of Observations  18337355 
Notes: 18337355 observations on 2096580 people.  Regression also includes dummy variables 
for national origin, level of education, type of education, “no-data,” industry, year, location and 
plant age.  Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses.  To save space, we only report 
coefficients on the mergers and acquisitions dummy variables in the seven years preceding and 
following a merger or acquisition.   
† p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.  These are two-tailed significance levels using robust 
standard errors.     29 
 
Table 3 
Averages of Coefficients on Merger or Acquisition Dummy Variables in 
Compensation Equation Five Years Before and After A Merger or Acquisition  
 
 
Coefficient on:  
Merger or Acquisition 
Dummy Variables  
MEAN OF MAt-5 TO MAt-1                        .0075*** 
                    (.0004) 
MEAN OF MAt+1 TO MAt+5           .0025*** 
                    (.0005) 
INCREASE PRE TO POST 
MERGER OR 
ACQUISITION 
                 
                   -.0050*** 
                   (.0006) 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 4 
Estimated Effects of a Merger or Acquisition on Plant-Level Productivity,  
Output, and Employment (Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 







MA-5      -.031 *** 






    -.028 *** 





MA-3      -.039 *** 





MA-2      -.036 *** 





MA-1      -.056 *** 





MA0      -.066 *** 





MAt+1      -.032 *** 





MAt+2      -.024 ***  





MAt+3      -.013 *  






   -.020 ** 





MAt+5     -.014 * 






‡        .375 *** 






‡        .270 *** 






‡        .347*** 





Intercept       2.084  ***             
(.143) 
  10.610 *** 
    (.059) 
  4.049 *** 
  (.049) 
R
2       0.960      0.358     0.301 
Number of Plants        15946  18,513    18,962 
Number of 
Observations 
   






Notes: † p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.  These are two-tailed significance levels using 
robust standard errors, allowing for correlated (“clustered”) errors within plants.  
‡ Weighted 
means of industry-specific coefficients at the detailed (4-digit SIC) industry level.  Regressions 
include “no-data, industry, age and year dummies.  




Estimated Effects of a Merger or Acquisition on Productivity, Output, and Employment for 
Various Types of Ownership Changes 
 
All Mergers and Acquisitions  
Period   Productivity  Output   Employment 
Pre-Ownership Change 
(Average-5 years Before) 
-0.038 **  0.179 ***  0.209 *** 
Post-Ownership Change 
(Average-5 years After) 
-0.021 **  0.093 ***  0.089 *** 
Post-Pre  0.017 **  -0.086 ***  -0.120 *** 
 
Full Acquisitions 
Period   Productivity   Output   Employment 
Pre-Ownership Change 
(Average-5 years Before) 
-0.038 ***  0.061 **  0.111 *** 
Post-Ownership Change 
(Average-5 years After) 
-0.024 ***  -0.055 **  -0.046 ** 
Post-Pre  0.014 *  -0.116 ***  -0.156 *** 
 
Partial Acquisitions 
Period   Productivity   Output   Employment 
Pre-Ownership Change 
(Average-5 years Before) 
-0.037 *  0.633 ***  0.584 *** 
Post-Ownership Change 
(Average-5 years After) 
-0.011  0.556 ***  0.510 *** 
Post-Pre  0.026 †   -0.076 *  -0.073 * 
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Table 6 
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Post-Pre  0.167 **  0.177 *   0.013 *** 
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Figure 1 
Worker-Level Regressions: Percentage Mean Earnings above Norm,  
Relative to Year of Merger or Acquisition 
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 Figure 2 
Plant-Level Regressions: Graphs of the Coefficients on the Mergers and Acquisitions Dummy 
Variables in the Productivity Equation  
 
 
 